

26 September 1979

NOTE FOR: DCI

VIA: DD/NFA

SUBJECT: Projected Intelligence Dog-and-Pony Show on Brigade

1. Marshall Brement, ZB's NSC staffer on the USSR, called at noon today and suggested that we give serious thought to preparing a public show-and-tell on the brigade in which we would lay out the evidence as a media event. He had sometime earlier mentioned this as a possibility, which I reported to you. I told him at the time that my personal view was that this would be a very bad idea, that a rerun of the Cuban missile crisis intelligence briefing, with the brigade substituting for missiles, was bound to be a farce, and that in any case, I thought it a great mistake to jeopardize intelligence sources and methods in an effort to document a threat [REDACTED]

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2. Brement did not quite say if he had been instructed to bring this matter up again, nor did he indicate this was to be regarded as a tasking. Rather he said it would be well for us to be prepared to react in the event that on short notice, we were asked to develop such a presentation. I told Brement that I thought the issues involved were sufficiently weighty that I would want to bring them to the attention of the DCI before taking any action.

3. Along the same lines, Brement also suggested that we be prepared to provide suitable graphics for the White Paper. [REDACTED]

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Finally, I reminded him that the White Paper was not an Intelligence Community product and should not be thought of as a sanitized intelligence document. I told him that I would bring this matter to the attention of the DCI as well.

4. I recommend that you focus on these questions, as well as on the broader question of what role you^{would} believe would be appropriate for the Intelligence Community to play, in the event that you are asked to participate in the media events that might well be scheduled for next week.

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EXCERPT FROM STATE DEPARTMENT DAILY BRIEFING

27 July 1979

Hodding Carter, Jr.

Alludes to DoD Comment yet to come.

Q Do you have any final word on the number of Russians who are now in Cuba or have recently gone to Cuba?

A We have not seen any buildup of Soviet ground forces there in some time.

Q Have you --

A I don't have any particular change.

Q There was a story around last weekend which --

A Yes; I saw that. The stories were all rather carefully done as a matter of fact; they, for the most part, went to Capitol Hill remarks.

I think, however, that there is one thing I want to say on that. Senator Stone has taken a particular interest in that issue, and I believe that Secretary Brown will be dealing directly again with him on that. And I would like, in any case, to just withhold any comment from here, since it hasn't really been addressed, and let that answer come there.

(SOVIET TROOPS)

(BY NICHOLAS DANILOFF)

WASHINGTON (UPI) - SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE TODAY CONFIRMED THAT MOSCOW HAS BOLSTERED ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA BUT DENIED THIS VIOLATES U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDINGS THAT DATE FROM THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS.

VANCE DISCLOSED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER RAISED ISSUE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA WITH SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT, WHERE THEY SIGNED THE SALT II ACCORD JUNE 18.

IN A LETTER TO SEN. RICHARD STONE, D-FLA., DATED FRIDAY, VANCE ACKNOWLEDGED SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA HAVE INCREASED, BUT NOT SUBSTANTIALLY:

"THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEAR OR OF THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET MILITARY BASE," HE SAID.

"...AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT WE GIVE INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE SITUATION AND MONITOR IT CLOSELY. THE PRESIDENT RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CUBA WITH PRESIDENT BREZHNEV IN VIENNA AND MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT A SOVIET BUILDUP WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP."

VANCE SAID, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET ACTIVITY TO DATE DOES NOT VIOLATE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN 1962 AND 1970 CONCERNING RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN CUBA.

STONE - WHO CALLED THAT ANALYSIS "A WHITENASH" - HAD WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT CARTER AFTER LEARNING THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE HAS DETECTED A SOVIET MILITARY COMMAND GROUP IN CUBA CAPABLE OF DIRECTING BRIGADE-SIZED FORCES.

PRESS REPORTS IN RECENT DAYS HAVE SUGGESTED THERE ARE UP TO 6,000 SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA, BUT STONE DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE NUMBERS BECAUSE THE DATA IS CLASSIFIED.

THE FLORIDA DEMOCRAT, WHO FACES RE-ELECTION IN 1980, HAD HARSH WORDS ABOUT VANCE'S LETTER.

"IF THE RESPONSE AS TO A LIKELY VIOLATION IS TO EXCUSE THEM, TO ALIBI THEM, TO SWEEP IT UNDER THE RUG, THEN I SAY IT IS A WHITENASH," HE SAID.

"IF WE ACCEPT A SMALL BASE, THEN WE HAVE NO STANDING TO OBJECT WHEN IT BECOMES A BIG BASE," HE SAID AT A NEWS CONFERENCE.

"THIS IS NOT CALCULATED TO INCREASE MY CONFIDENCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO CALL THE SOVIETS ON A VIOLATION COMPEL COMPLIANCE."

UNDER THE 1962 UNDERSTANDING THAT ENDED THAT YEAR'S CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE SOVIETS DISMANTLED THE INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES THAT THREATENED THE UNITED STATES AND AGREED NOT TO INTRODUCE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS INTO CUBA. THE UNITED STATES IN TURN PROMISED NOT TO ATTACK CUBA.

IN 1970, THE SOVIETS AGREED NOT TO BUILD A MILITARY BASE IN CUBA AFTER THE UNITED STATES PROTESTED WHAT APPEARED TO BE THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FACILITY TO SERVICE NUCLEAR MISSILE SUBMARINES.

STONE SAID THAT, IN THE ONGOING SALT HEARINGS, HE WOULD CONTINUE TO TEST THE ADMINISTRATION'S DETERMINATION TO CALL THE RUSSIANS ON POTENTIAL FUTURE VIOLATIONS OF THE SALT TREATY.

UPI 07-27 03:51 PED

STATE COMMENT
31 July 1979

STATEMENT FOR PRESS

SOVIET GROUND UNIT IN CUBA

We have recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet ground unit. This is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island.

Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976. We estimate that it consists of 2,000 to 3,000 men. In addition, we estimate that the Soviets maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 Soviet military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba. The unit includes armored, artillery and infantry elements.

EXCERPT FROM DoD NEWS BRIEF

7 August 1979 TOM ROSS

Q: What does the Defense Department know about a reported increased Soviet military command presence in Cuba and what is the Defense Department's degree of concern about same?

A: The Secretary testified in closed session to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 17 and after that session Senators Church and Javits issued a statement in which they said Secretary Brown advised the Committee that "there is no evidence of any substantial increase in the size of the Soviet military presence over the past few years. There has been a Soviet military group advising Cuba's armed forces for fifteen years or more. There is no evidence to warrant a conclusion of any other Soviet military force in Cuba." I've just nothing to add to that.

Q: Is that statement still valid, however?

A: Yes, we stand on that statement.

Q: When he says no evidence of substantial increase, that means there has been an increase, does it not?

A: I would judge that it means there might have been a very modest increase.

STATE DEPARTMENT DAILY BRIEFING

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8 AUGUST 1979

TOM RESTON

Q Tom, last week I raised the question about Secretary Vance's replies on questions from Senator Stone about certain Soviet actions in Cuba, including the buildup of the submarine base at Cienfuegos.

You had referred me to certain documentation which I examined and which indicated the State Department did not think that the buildup of that submarine base was a violation of the 1962 accords with the Soviet Union. I checked with an unusually reliable source, the Memoirs of Richard Nixon, which say that -- speaking of that 1970 buildup when they discovered that this submarine base was being built in Cuba -- that they did think it was a violation of the accord. The State Department also thought that it was a violation. Representations were made to the Soviet Union about this. From their actions it was interpreted that they agreed that it was a violation of the accord.

My question, Tom, is this: What has happened to change our interpretation of that accord since 1970 and since that exchange? What is the current status of that base?

A First of all, I can think of no better spokesman for the Nixon Administration than the former President himself. As to the second question, I would imagine that if there had been a

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change in interpretation, it would have to do with perhaps a change in the facts. I don't have any current status to offer you about what is going on in Cienfuegos, but I will take that question.

We stand by what the Secretary of State said in his letter to Senator Stone about Soviet activity in Cuba.

We have been all through it; Tom Ross went all through it again yesterday in his briefing at the Pentagon. I have nothing to add.

Q My question is that it appeared to me, from the documentation that I obtained from your office last week, that the Department was perhaps unaware of the exchange that had taken place in 1970 over this matter. Could you look into that too, and see if the Department had forgotten what had transpired between Nixon, Kissinger and the Soviet Government at that time?

A No. I don't really think that it's necessary for me to undertake to find out in detail for you what happened 10 years ago in a prior administration.

Q Tom, isn't that part of the record, as to what these agreements provide for? Can we just ignore the past?

A You can ignore the past if you want, but I am not in a position to answer your question.

Q Thank you, Tom.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

* * * * *

31 July 1979

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TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING CONGRESS

SOVIET GROUND UNIT IN CUBA

We have recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet ground unit. This is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island.

Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976. We estimate that it consists of 2,000 to 3,000 men. In addition, we estimate that the Soviets maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 Soviet military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba. The unit includes armored, artillery and infantry elements.

The mission of the unit is as yet unclear.

As currently configured and supported, the unit poses no threat to the U.S.

Ground forces did not figure in our bilateral understandings with the Soviets which were directed toward offensive weapons systems.

The presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba or elsewhere in this hemisphere is nonetheless a source of serious concern to us, particularly in the context of the continuing expansion of Soviet-Cuban military ties.

We have in recent months expressed to the Soviets our deep concern over the Soviet/Cuban military relationship. On August 30 we informed the Soviet Charge that the brigade's presence could have serious bilateral consequences. We expect the Soviets will take seriously our expressions of concern, and are continuing at the highest levels our discussions with them on this subject.

We will, of course, closely monitor all aspects of Soviet military activities in Cuba to ensure there is no threat to the U.S.

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Texts of Letter and Statements by Vance and Carter

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 5 — Following are the texts of a July 27 letter from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance to Senator Richard Stone, Democrat of Florida, denying an increase of Soviet strength in Cuba; of the Aug. 31 announcement by Jimmy Carter 3d, the State Department spokesman, confirming the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, and of Mr. Vance's opening statement at a news conference today:

Vance's Letter to Stone

Dear Senator Stone:

The President has asked me to respond to your July 24 letter to him on Soviet military presence in Cuba. I very much appreciate your calling to our attention reports of a possible high-ranking Soviet command structure in Cuba.

I wish to reaffirm the President's statement to you that it is the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere. However, there is no evidence of any substantial increase of the Soviet military presence in Cuba over the past several years or of a Soviet military base. Apart from a military group that has been advising the Cuban armed forces for 15 years or more our intelligence does not warrant the conclusion that there are any other significant Soviet forces in Cuba. At the same time the President directed that we give increased attention to the situation and monitor it closely. This is being done. The President raised the question of the Soviet presence in Cuba with President Brezhnev in Vienna and made clear to him that a Soviet buildup would adversely affect our relationship.

You have also raised questions on the 1962 understanding in your letter to the President and during the appearances of Secretary Brown and myself before the S.F.R.C. [Senate Foreign Relations Committee]. The United States and the Soviet Union both recognize that an understanding on Cuba exists. This understanding is reflected in the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence of October and November, 1962, (particularly the letters of Oct. 27 and 23, 1962) and in communications between the two Governments in the fall of 1970 concerning the establishment of Soviet naval bases in Cuba. We have no evidence that the Soviets are in violation of this understanding.

President Nixon addressed the scope of the understanding in 1971, and stated, "in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding." Subsequently, in the early 1970's, submarines did make occasional port calls. According to the understanding with the Soviet Union such port calls do not constitute violations.

You have asked that we assure the American people that they have full knowledge of the understanding. The essential understanding is in the public record. The Soviets agreed in 1962 that offensive weapons could not again be introduced into Cuba. In 1970 it was made clear that this understanding included sea-based systems.

Although the Oct. 27 and 23, 1962, letters and many other documents from this period are not classified, there are additional diplomatic exchanges, made in confidence, which must remain classified.

They are consistent with publicly available documents. The principle of confidentiality of diplomatic communication is respected throughout the international community and is carefully applied in our relations with the Soviet Union to insure the free flow of communication that is essential to the maintenance of world peace. A breach of confidentiality in this context could easily impair our ability to deal with the Soviets in the future.

If you wish any further background, please do not hesitate to inform me.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
CYRUS VANCE

Carter's Statement

We have recently confirmed the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit. This is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island.

Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least 1976.

We estimate that it consists of 2,000 to 3,000 men. The unit includes armored, artillery and infantry elements. In addition, we estimate that the Soviets maintain between 1,500 and 2,000 military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba.

As currently configured and supported, the unit poses no threat to the U.S.

Ground forces per se did not figure in our bilateral understandings with the Soviets, which were directed toward offensive-weapon systems.

Nonetheless, we are concerned with

the presence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba.

We have in recent months raised with the Soviets the issue of the Soviet/Cuban military relationship. On Aug. 29 we called in the Soviet chargé to express our concerns about the Soviet ground force unit. We will continue our discussions with them on this subject.

We will, of course, continue to monitor all aspects of Soviet military activities in Cuba to insure there is no threat to the U.S.

Vance's Statement

Let me begin with a few comments on the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. We regard this as a very serious matter, affecting our relations with the Soviet Union. The presence of this unit runs counter to long-held American policies.

The identification of this unit as a Soviet combat force has recently been confirmed by our intelligence community. They have now concluded that this force has been in Cuba since at least the mid-1970's. Re-analysis of older, fragmentary data in the light of more recently acquired information suggests that elements of a Soviet brigade may have been there since the early 1970's — and possibly before that. The process of re-analyzing our earlier information continues.

The unit appears to consist of 2-to-3,000 personnel. It includes motorized rifle battalions, tank and artillery battalions and combat and service support elements. These figures are separate from the Soviet military advisory and technical military personnel in Cuba, which we now estimate at between 1,500 and 2,000.

The specific mission of the combat unit is unclear. There is no air or sealift capability associated with the brigade which would give it an assault capability. Nor is the presence of this unit covered by our bilateral understandings with the Soviets in 1962 or 1970.

Nonetheless, the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba is a matter of serious concern.

I will be pursuing this matter with the Soviets in the coming days.

I will be discussing this issue with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon and setting forth the approach we plan to take with the Soviets. We will keep the press and the public informed to the fullest extent we can as we proceed. I know you will understand that the interests of our country would not be served by now going into the specific nature of our approach.

SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE IN CUBA

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THE WHITE HOUSE

ANNOUNCEMENT

BY

THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

4:15 P.M. EDT

I want to take two minutes to speak to you about the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. The facts relating to this issue have been carefully laid out by Secretary Vance, both in his public statement and in his testimony before the Congress. The facts, in brief, are as follows:

We have concluded, as the consequences of intensified intelligence efforts, that a Soviet combat unit is currently stationed in Cuba. We have some evidence to indicate that such a unit has been in Cuba for some time, perhaps for quite a few years.

The brigade consists of 2,000 to 3,000 troops. It's equipped with conventional weapons, such as about 40 tanks and some field artillery pieces, and has conducted training as an organized unit.

It is not an assault force. It does not have air-lift or sea-going capability and does not have weapons capable of attacking the United States.

The purpose of this combat unit is not yet clear. However, the Secretary of State spoke for me and for our Nation on Wednesday when he said that we consider the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to be a very serious matter, and that this status quo is not acceptable.

We are confident about our ability to defend our country, or any of our friends from external aggression. The issue posed is of a different nature. It involves the stationing of Soviet combat troops here in the Western Hemisphere in a country which acts as a Soviet proxy in military adventures in other areas of the world, like Africa.

We do have the right to insist that the Soviet Union respect our interests and our concerns. If the Soviet Union expects us to respect their sensibilities and their concerns. Otherwise, relations between our two countries will inevitably be adversely affected. We are seriously pursuing this issue with the Soviet Union, and we are consulting closely with the Congress.

Let me emphasize that this is a sensitive issue that faces our Nation, all of us, and our Nation as a whole must respond not only with firmness and strength, but also with calm and a sense of proportion.

This is a time for firm diplomacy, not panic and not exaggeration. As Secretary Vance discusses this issue with Soviet representatives in the coming days, the Congress and the American people can help to ensure a successful outcome of these discussions and negotiations by preserving an atmosphere in which our diplomacy can work.

I know I speak for the leadership in Congress, with whom I have met this afternoon, as well as for my own administration when I express my confidence that our Nation can continue to show itself to be calm and steady as well as strong and firm. Thank you very much.

NON-PARTICIPANTS UNIT
3:00 PM, EDT, SATURDAY,
SEPTEMBER 8, 1979

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SEPTEMBER 7, 1979

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AT A
MEETING WITH NON-WASHINGTON EDITORS

160 Old Executive Office Building

(No Times)

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me just make a few introductory remarks and then I am at your service to answer any questions that you may wish to pose.

I think it is useful to note that the posturing of Cuba as a nonaligned country is fundamentally ridiculous.

Castro is a puppet of the Soviet Union and we view him as such. Throughout the world there isn't one instance in which Castro has deviated from official Soviet policy in any respect whatsoever. Castro economically is totally dependent on subventions from the Soviet Union. The \$3 billion annual Soviet economic aid to Cuba represents one-quarter of Cuba's gross national product.

Soviet industrial projects in Cuba account for 30 percent of Cuba's electric power output; ninety-five percent of Cuba's steel production; 100 percent of Cuba's sheet metal output and the bulk of Cuba's sugar harvest mechanization; approximately three-fifths of Cuba's imports come from the Soviet Union; and so does virtually all of Cuba's oil at a 40 percent discount from the average OPEC prices.

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The Soviet Union purchases 72 percent of all Cuban exports and arranges for East European nations to buy Cuban sugar at prices well above world prices. In fact, I wonder how the Jamaicans, for example, react to the fact that the Cubans get five times over the world price for sugar.

Militarily, Cuba is entirely dependent on the Soviet Union. Soviet military support for Cuba goes far beyond Cuba's defensive needs, as witnessed by the fact that the large proportion of the military equipment supplied to Cuba is used by Cubans in combat abroad and far from Cuba.

The Soviet Union supplies to Cuba jet fighters, transports, submarines, missile patrol boats, attack helicopters and antisubmarine patrol boats.

Cuba provides the manpower and since 1975, it has been converting its armed forces from a primarily defensive role to one capable of offensive operations far from Cuban shores. In keeping with that, Cuba deploys forces -- combat troops I mean -- and advisors in Africa where it acts as a proxy for Soviet military intervention. It does so in the Horn of Africa, in the Yemen and elsewhere.

In effect, Cuba is an active surrogate for a foreign policy which is not shaped by itself and is paid for this by economic and military support on a scale that underlines Cuba's status as a dependent client of the Soviet Union.

I think I will limit my opening remarks to that and take any questions if you wish. It would help me if you would identify yourself.

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Q I am Bill Pace from the Topics Newspaper from Indianapolis
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In the Cuban missile crisis, there are many people feel we lost it. We had an aggressive mood with the Soviet Union and in response, we gave them a guarantee that we would not invade Cuba. Do you think there is a chance this might be another quid pro quo to where they have taken an aggressive mood in hopes that it might help pass the SALT agreement?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: First of all, I don't really agree with your characterization of the 1962 outcome. At that time, it is to be remembered there was a major international crisis in progress over Berlin, which was then greatly inflamed by the placement of Soviet strategic weaponry in Cuba. That strategic weaponry was removed and the Berlin crisis terminated. We are dealing today with a different situation and I think we should be very careful. I believe we have a historical obligation to discriminate. We are not dealing with a strategic crisis, nor are we dealing with a direct and overt military threat directed at the United States. We have great capability to defend ourselves and defend our friends. The issue is of a different nature. It involves the stationing of Soviet combat forces in the Western Hemisphere in a country which at the same time is pursuing an internationally active revolutionary role. It is more, therefore, of a political problem.

I believe that with firmness, resolve, but also restraint we can work this problem out and, therefore, I think we should avoid analogies that inflame the situation or that create the impression you are dealing with a strategic confrontation of the 1962 type. We are not. It's a different problem and I'm confident that if there is mutual restraint and mutual recognition that each side has to be sensitive to the concerns of the other, that we will work this out.

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Q George Anderson, Pine Bluff News. Do you know the exact nature of the mission of the Soviet troops there in the past few years? They apparently have been there three or four years. It's a training mission or is it a --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: That is a very difficult question to answer. Do you know the exact motives of everybody you deal with? Some times even in a love affair, do you know the exact motive you are dealing with? You don't. You can only judge by action. When you are dealing with a country which has ^{had} troops in another country over a prolonged period of time you may have a situation in which first of all their reasons for their presence, over time may have changed and, secondly, even the policy makers themselves may have different interests. The ideologues may think of the revolutionary aspects and Soviet identification with the revolutionary aspects. The political strategist may think of the reinforcement of Cuba's resolve and morale. The military may think of the training benefits of a presence here as well as the tactical benefits of a presence here. The intelligence people may think of the security it offers to Soviet intelligence activities. It's a variety of different reasons that probably go into the initial decision and that initial decision is also over time changed by the circumstances within which it's implemented.

What is of concern to us is, as I said earlier, the presence of an organized combat formation in the Western Hemisphere and in a country that is certainly pursuing very actively policies that are adverse to us and is doing so by means which include violence.

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QUESTION: JIM BARBIERI, BRISTOL, INDIANA, News Banner. My question is in regard to the Cuban knowledge from a missionary that were run out of Zaire and the problems there about the direct intervention of the Cuban troops in trouble making, and yet the Ambassador to the United Nations from the United States made statements about the Cubans having a stabilizing force in Africa.

Now, what you are presenting us today is more, -- do I understand it to be more of what the official administration position would be today with regard to the troublesome, or what's implied troublesome nature of Cuban activity in Africa and elsewhere?

I think it relates to SALT II because SALT II has to be considered in the light not only of a threat to the United States in a direct conflict, but also of Soviet takeovers of other parts of the world by threat if they were in a military position.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me make two points about this. What I have stated represents our official perspective on Cuban behavior and on Cuban dependence on the Soviet Union.

What I have stated is consistent with, and in some respects, a repetition of what Secretary Vance posted in the Department of State immediately after his recent statement as a further amplification in response to a question that was submitted at the conclusion of his remarks.

Insofar as SALT is concerned, I wish to emphasize that we do not see these two things as linked. I have been deeply involved in SALT; I am also deeply involved in assuring our national security. I'm not one of those who is accused of minimizing the challenge that is posed to our national security. But I believe strongly that SALT is in our national interest for reasons that are specifically related to the requirements of strategic equivalents.

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As I look at the present situation, as I look at the trends that have manifested themselves in the course of the recent years and are likely to manifest themselves in the course of the next several years, I conclude with utter assurance that with SALT II and with the defense steps that we need to take, and that the President has been initiating, thereby reversing the decline of recent years in our defense efforts, we will be better off than if we don't have SALT II and to take the same defense steps.

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Let me repeat, the President is the first President in 15 years to reverse the steady trend of a declining effort in the area of strategic and overall defense capabilities. We will be taking additional steps, within the hour the President will be announcing a significant decision on the MX; namely, its deployment mode. It will rank, I am convinced, as one of the three significant strategic decisions made by U. S. Presidents since World War II; on a par with the decision by President Truman to set up the Strategic Air Command, on a par with the decision by President Kennedy to go into land-based missiles, Minuteman II, Minuteman III.

We have done this because we believe an additional effort now is required in the defense area, and additional steps will follow. These steps will be more effective in assuring strategic equivalence if they are undertaken within the context of a ratified SALT II agreement, which gives us greater stability and predictability as to what we will be facing on the other side.

If we don't have SALT II, Soviet momentum in strategic development will continue unchecked, it will be less predictable in terms of its consequences and, therefore, the positive effects of what we intend to do will be lessened.

In all probability, we would then have to do probably even more in the defense area and we would be more uncertain that it is sufficient than if we do what we intend to do in the context of SALT II. I therefore think it is fundamentally prejudicial to our interests to link SALT II to Soviet behavior elsewhere. It really is, I think, self-defeating and if I may even go even further than that, escapist.

We ought to ratify SALT II. We ought to take defense steps we need to take and this President is the first President in years to take them, and we ought to meet the challenge on its merits and directly in terms of seeking a proper resolution of contentious issues and competing more assertively, if necessary.

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I think those who are saying, "Let's hold out on SALT II," I think they are chickening out, frankly. I think we need to do all three things: Get SALT ratified, do more in the defense area, and face up to the fact that we need to compete. In competing, we need to be prudent and restrained and try to work out problems diplomatically. That is what we are trying to do in the case of this issue, but also compete assertively, if necessary.

Q Steve Rogers, Syracuse newspaper. Why did it take the United States so long to determine or verify the presence of a 3,000-man force in Cuba, and given the fact it may have taken a long time, doesn't that raise various questions in our ability to verify other strategic developments, including those with SALT?

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MR. BRZEZINSKI: Let me make several points about that. First of all, you usually don't find quite as easily that which you are not looking for than that which you are looking for.

In other words, if you concentrate your efforts on looking for something and you mobilize your resources to find it you are more likely to find it than if you are not looking for it. If you are not looking for it, you are more likely to stumble into it.

Over the years, we have had some indications that there are Soviet forces in Cuba, but sporadic, limited, nonconclusive. As these indications mounted in the course of this year, the President expressed to me his concern over this and in July, I issued an instruction to the Central Intelligence Agency specifying in detail that all intelligence gathering efforts regarding Cuba have to be maximized, and intensified. And the Agency responded and in so doing began to accumulate more evidence which gives us the base for firm conclusion. Insofar as SALT II is concerned, I would like to add further that there is no parallel between the two. We, first of all, have a great deal of experience in monitoring ^{weapons} for strategic development, for strategic deployment. We have acquired the experience in the course of monitoring SALT I. We have spent a great deal of money developing a variety of sophisticated and even redundant systems for monitoring Soviet weapons development and deployment.

Finally, SALT itself provides for provisions inhibiting and prohibiting deception and therefore it is a violation of SALT agreements to try to deceive. Whereas, there were no regulations governing the presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba as such. And we were not, at that time, inclined to the view that there was military personnel, organized in combat units in Cuba. We had no indication of sufficient weight to warrant a presumption of that and, therefore, we weren't looking for it.

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I am reasonably confident that if we had set out to establish this area, we probably would have done so. The moment this Administration concluded that more needs to be done, and the President ordered it, we did, in fact, establish the facts to the point that we could reach the conclusion that we did. Yes.

Q Skelly of El Nuevo Dia, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

You talk about three points that you are doing in your policy; the third one, of working it out in a diplomatic way with the Soviets. I don't believe this is what is upsetting Members of Congress of your own party, since you have been in office, the deterioration of the encroachment of Cuba and Africa and Nicaragua? It was established by the State Department and a CIA memorandum that Cuba supplied at least 500 trained Nicaraguan Sandinistas; they were transported from Cuba to Panama on Panama Air Force planes and the United States allowed and tolerated that Costa Rica be used as a sanctuary for the hit-and-run and eventually the downfall of Somoz

You are saying that you are doing this, but apparently the members of your own party, the leaders in Congress, like Senator Jackson, don't believe that you are doing this. What do you intend to do that will give them some indication that you really are going to get tough with the Soviets?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think it is better in a situation of this sort to be judged by results rather than by public posturing in the middle of a problem.

Q Don't you believe you have a Marxist government now in Nicaragua that's alive --

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MR. BRZEZINSKI: I would say we have a government in Nicaragua that is mixed in its character, that is a coalition of different groups -- progressive, radical, some liberals and some avowed Marxists, including those very sympathetic to Castro and supported by Castro.

We are not unaware of the fact that Castro aided the Sandinistas. ^{But} we are also aware of the fact that Costa Rica which is not a Marxist country, aided ^{the} guerillas. We are also aware of the fact that Venezuela which is a non-Marxist country which even crushed the Castro rebellion years ago aided the Sandinistas. We believe that there is a possibility that the outcome in Nicaragua will be a government that is responsive to the plurality of Nicaraguan life, its Catholic tradition, the fact that there is a tradition of free enterprise and so forth. We don't know what the eventual outcome will be, but I think it will be a mistake for us to jump to the conclusion that every uprising against a very conservative or even reactionary authoritarian government has to be Castroite because if we do that then we may end up in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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Q Let me follow up on that. Your CIA memorandum, which is irrefutable --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I wouldn't jump to that conclusion, necessarily.

Q Well, you asked the CIA to find out about troops in Cuba. I am sure you can rely on the same agency to find out who helped Nicaragua.

Q The entire armed forces of Nicaragua, the police, and the army are in the hands of the Castro group guerillas --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: No, I wouldn't jump to that conclusion.

Q You have people on the ruling junta who are nothing more than puppets of that regime.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I wouldn't jump to that --

Q The true power lies, does it not, with the Sandinistas who trained in Cuba --

MR. BRZEZINSKI; No, the Sandinista movement is an amalgam of radical and progressive movements, a significant wing of which was trained in Cuba and much of which was supported by Cuba, but the point that I am making is that it is an amalgam, and there are different elements in it, some of which, doubtless, are very sympathetic to Castro, some of whom may be controlled by Castro, but some of whom are not. It is an amalgam, and the eventual outcome of the political process in Nicaragua is not yet pre-determined. I think we would be helping to pre-determine it in advance by labeling all of them as Castroite agents. I think it would be counter-productive.

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Q Is it realistic --

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Have you spoken before?

Q Yes.

Q Rae Hederman, Jackson, Mississippi.

Why was the Soviet buildup in Cuba brought to attention first by Senator Church, rather than the Administration?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I don't think it was brought to attention by Senator Church first. The fact of the matter is we have informed the Senators ourselves and this is part of our responsibility. The Senators are representatives of the people. We inform the public by going to representatives of the people and informing them.

The Senator is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was very appropriate to inform him.

Another Senator had raised questions about it, so we all informed him. I believe we fulfilled our obligation by briefing them and in that process, and we were aware of it, informing the public. At the same time, we are working for a resolution of this problem, and I have to underline the fact that the resolution of this problem is going to be easier if we don't pump it up ourselves too much.

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We recognize its gravity. The Secretary of State has underlined its gravity, and we are pursuing it with that recognition, but we do not see any utility in pumping it up publicly while trying to resolve it.

Obviously we have to be able to talk to the Soviets in a serious fashion in order to have a constructive outcome, and we are aware of the fact that the Soviets, in order for the U. S.-Soviet detente to be stable, have to be respectful of our interests and concerns, and on that basis, we can also assure them that we will be so in regard to their sensitivities and concerns.

I think that that is a proposition they ought to weigh very heavily in determining how they will respond to the problem that both of us now confront.

I am sorry; I wish to be with you longer. I really do have to go because of this MX business, unless it is very quick.

Q I wanted to get your opinion. Do you think we are going to get ratification of SALT II this year?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: Yes, sir, because we need it and it's good for our national security, and I really stress that point. Thank you very much.

END

(At 10:13 A.M. EDT)

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